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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL L. JENSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 44663
Idaho County Case No.
CR-2014-58163

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Issue
Has Jensen failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
denying his Rule 35 motion for reduction of his unified sentence of four years, with two
years fixed, imposed following his guilty plea to felony DUI?

Jensen Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion
Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, Jensen pled guilty to felony DUI
(third DUI conviction within 10 years); the state agreed to not file additional charges
related to the same incident; the parties stipulated that Jensen would be placed on
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supervised probation with an underlying unified sentence of four years, with two years
fixed; and Jensen waived his “right to appeal the judgment and sentence” but “expressly
reserve[d] his right to appeal any subsequent decisions of the Court related to a
subsequent revocation of probation or motion to reduce the sentence pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35.” (R., pp.60-77.) The district court accepted the plea agreement,
imposed the requested sentence, and placed Jensen on supervised probation for four
years. (R., pp.86-92.)
Approximately nine months later, Jensen violated his probation by driving with a
suspended driver’s license “periodically for [a] month” and consuming alcohol.

(R.,

pp.105-09.) The district court revoked Jensen’s probation, executed the underlying
sentence, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.121-23.) Following the period of retained
jurisdiction, at the jurisdictional review hearing, Jensen’s counsel requested that the
district court reconsider and reduce Jensen’s sentence pursuant to Rule 35 if it
relinquished jurisdiction. (Tr., p.9, L.19 – p.11, L.5.) The district court relinquished
jurisdiction and declined to reduce Jensen’s sentence. (R., pp.132-33; Tr., p.21, Ls.1623.) Jensen subsequently filed a second Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence,
which the district court denied. (R., pp.134-35, 139-42.) Jensen filed a notice of appeal
timely, under the prison mailbox rule, 1 from the district court’s order denying his second
Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.161-64.)
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Under the “mailbox rule,” notices of appeal and post-conviction petitions filed by
inmates are deemed to be filed on the date they are delivered to prison officials for filing
with the court. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 786 P.2d 594 (Ct. App. 1990), cited with
approval in Munson v. State, 128 Idaho 639, 917 P.2d 796 (1996).
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Jensen asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence in light of his substance abuse, willingness to
participate in treatment, health problems and “issues with alcohol dementia,” and
because, at the time that the court relinquished jurisdiction, Jensen’s wife – who
“monitored” him before she was hospitalized due to an illness – was “‘back home’” and
could again monitor him. (Appellant’s brief, pp.2-5.) Jensen’s argument fails for three
reasons. First, Jensen waived the right to challenge his sentence as excessive and
failed to provide any new information in support of his Rule 35 motion. Second, the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Jensen’s successive Rule 35 motion.
Finally, even if this Court reviews the merits of Jensen’s claim, he has failed to establish
an abuse of discretion.
The waiver of the right to appeal as a component of a plea agreement is valid
and will be enforced if it was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. State v.
Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 872 P.2d 719 (1994).
Pursuant to the plea agreement, signed by Jensen, Jensen waived his right to
appeal “the judgment and sentence.” (R., p.66.) He also acknowledged that he was
waiving his right to appeal his sentence in the signed guilty plea advisory form. (R.,
p.72.) At the guilty plea hearing, the district court reviewed the Rule 11 plea agreement
and found that Jensen had entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, and
Jensen has not challenged that determination on appeal. (R., pp.60-61.) Although, as
part of the plea agreement, Jensen “expressly reserve[d] his right to challenge any
subsequent decisions of the Court related to a … motion to reduce the sentence
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35” (R., p.66), the state submits that, under the facts of
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this case, Jensen’s waiver of his right to appeal his sentence incorporated his right to
appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 request for leniency because Jensen failed to
support his Rule 35 motion with any new evidence. As explained by the Idaho Court of
Appeals:
We hold that [the defendant’s] appellate challenge to the denial of
his Rule 35 motion has been waived by his plea agreement. [The
defendant’s] plea agreement contained a clause by which [he] waived his
right to appeal his sentence. Arguably, that waiver did not preclude [the
defendant] from filing a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence in the
trial court. However, because [the defendant] filed no new evidence in
support of that Rule 35 motion, an appeal from the order denying the
motion would amount to nothing more than a challenge to the
reasonableness of the sentence as originally imposed. To allow an
appellate challenge to the denial of the Rule 35 in these circumstances
would allow [the defendant] and similarly-situated defendants to evade the
appeal waiver in their plea agreements by merely filing an unsupported
Rule 35 motion and appealing the subsequent denial order. Accordingly,
we dismiss [this] appeal.
State v. Rodriguez, 142 Idaho 786, 787, 133 P.3d 1251, 1252 (Ct. App. 2006)
(emphasis in original, internal citation and footnote omitted). Because, as discussed in
more detail below, Jensen failed to support his Rule 35 motion with any information that
could legitimately be characterized as new, his appeal should be dismissed.
Even if the Court finds Jensen did not waive his right to appeal, the district court’s
order denying Jensen’s successive Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence should
be affirmed because the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 provides that “no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction
of sentence under this Rule.” In State v. Bottens, 137 Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875 (Ct. App.
2002), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that “a motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule
35 motion is an improper successive motion and is prohibited by Rule 35. We hold that
the prohibition of successive motions under Rule 35 is a jurisdictional limit.”
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Jensen first moved for a Rule 35 reduction of sentence at the May 16, 2016,
jurisdictional review hearing, and the district court denied the motion. (Tr., p.9, L.14 –
p.11, L.5; p.21, Ls.16-23.) Jensen filed a second Rule 35 request for a reduction of
sentence on June 30, 2016. (R., pp.134-35.) At the hearing on Jensen’s second Rule
35 motion, the district court acknowledged that there was “a previous motion for
leniency” in this case. (Tr., p.28, L.1.) The district court denied Jensen’s second,
successive Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence on August 3, 2016. (R., pp.13942.) Jensen did not deliver his notice of appeal to prison authorities for mailing until
September 12, 2016; therefore, his appeal is timely only from the district court’s order
denying his second, successive Rule 35 motion for sentence reduction. (R., pp.16164.) Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Jensen’s successive Rule
35 motion, the court’s order denying the motion must be affirmed.
Even if the Court considers the merits of Jensen’s claim, Jensen has still failed to
establish an abuse of discretion. In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does not
function as an appeal of a sentence.” The Court noted that where a sentence is within
statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion is merely a request for leniency, which is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. Id. Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information
subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Absent
the presentation of new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion
cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence.” Id. Accord State v.
Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008).
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Jensen did not appeal his judgment of conviction, the order revoking probation,
or the order relinquishing jurisdiction, and he provided no new information in support of
his Rule 35 motion. The district court was aware, at the time of sentencing, of Jensen’s
substance abuse issues and motivation for treatment, his liver disease and “issues with
alcohol dementia,” that his wife provided him support and “supervision,” and that his
original sentence was “partially designed to help motivate [him] while on probation.”
(PSI, pp.8, 41-42, 47; 2 Tr., p.28, Ls.4-24; R., pp.134-35.) In fact, the stipulation for
probation in the original plea agreement was reached in large part due to Jensen’s
health issues, with the belief that Jensen “didn’t have much longer to live, possibly only
six months,” and that he would be “sort of under his wife’s supervision” while on
probation. (Tr., p.28, Ls.9-15; p.31, L.18 – p.32, L.9.) Jensen’s claim that his relapse
and “poor decision-making” while on probation coincided with his wife’s illness and her
placement in a medical facility was before the district court at the time that it revoked
probation, and the fact that Jensen’s wife was “back home” recovering from her illness
and could resume monitoring him (as at the time of sentencing) was before the court at
the time that it relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.106, 135; PSI, pp.84, 92.) As such,
none of the information Jensen subsequently provided in support of his Rule 35 motion
was new information before the district court, and Jensen’s problems and
circumstances were the same as they were at the time of sentencing. Because Jensen
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “Jensen
Appeal PSI.pdf.”
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presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, he failed to demonstrate in
the motion that his sentence was excessive. Having failed to make such a showing, he
has failed to establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying his Rule
35 motion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests that this Court dismiss Jensen’s appeal because
he waived his right to appeal his sentence. Alternatively, the state requests this Court
to affirm the district court’s order denying Jensen’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence.

DATED this 30th day of June, 2017.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming_______________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of June, 2017, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF by emailing an electronic copy to:
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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